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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 13-4181 
_______________ 
 
FRED BURTON, 
                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MARTIN HORN, COMMISSIONER, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS;  SUPERINTENDENT SOMERSET STATE CORRECTION 
INSTITUTION;  THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF 
PHILADELPHIA;  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Civ. No. 2-09-cv-02435) 
District Judge: Honorable Norma L. Shapiro 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 18, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 9, 2015) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
                                                   
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
  This case arises from the ambush of Philadelphia police officers in Fairmount Park 
in August of 1970. Fred Burton was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison for 
his role as a conspirator in the crime. He now petitions the court for a writ of habeas corpus 
based on purported Brady violations at the time of his trial. Burton concedes that, under the 
most favorable calculable deadline, his petition is untimely. He contends that he should 
nevertheless be permitted to advance his claims because he can show his actual innocence 
within the meaning of McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013), and because he was 
unable to file his petition sooner notwithstanding diligent pursuit of his claims, warranting 
tolling. We do not agree, and we will deny the petition.  
I. 
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides that a state prisoner must generally file his or her 
habeas petition within one year of the later of final judgment or April 23, 1997.1 One 
exception to this is when the prisoner was prevented from filing a petition by 
unconstitutional state action; then the prisoner has one year from the date the impediment is 
removed. Another exception is when the factual predicate of the claim could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; then the prisoner has one year from the 
                                                   
1 See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998). Burton’s petition is also 
successive, but the successive petition restrictions of § 2244 do not apply to him because 
his previous petitions were submitted prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591, 609 (3d Cir. 
1999). Though the pre-AEDPA restrictions on successive filing do apply to him, those 
restrictions are not at issue in this appeal.  
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date the factual predicate could have been discovered. The § 2244(d) limitations period “is 
subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.”2 Additionally, § 2244(d)’s timeliness 
requirements do not bar a claim where a petitioner makes a “convincing actual-innocence 
claim” within the meaning of Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).3  
 Burton was tried for and convicted of murder in December 1972 and thereafter 
sentenced to life in prison.4 His sentence became final in 1975 when the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.5 Burton filed this counseled 
petition for habeas corpus in 2009, more than two decades after his sentence became final, 
and more than one decade after the expiration of the grace period for pre-AEDPA 
convictions. According to Burton, his one year limitations period began to run on August 
22, 2005, because this was the date on which the government allegedly removed an 
impediment to his filing.6 On this view, Burton would ordinarily have until August 22, 2006 
to file his petition. Even under Burton’s own argument, then, his petition is untimely unless 
he can demonstrate the applicability of tolling or an exception. The District Court 
                                                   
2 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 
3 McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1935. 
4 Burton was later involved in another locally notorious homicide: the double homicide of 
the warden and deputy warden at Holmesburg Prison, where Burton was incarcerated. 
Burton was convicted of one count of second degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. 
See Commonwealth v. Burton, 417 A.2d 611 (Pa. 1980). 
5 See Commonwealth v. Burton, 330 A.2d 833 (Pa. 1974).  
6 The District Court concluded that Burton’s one year limitations period began to run in 
August 2003—more than one year before he filed for post-conviction relief in the 
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determined neither tolling nor an exception applies and denied Burton’s petition as time-
barred.7 
II. 
 On appeal, Burton first argues that he has made a convincing demonstration of his 
actual innocence such that the § 2244(d) time-bar should not apply. This “miscarriage of 
justice exception . . . applies to a severely confined category: cases in which new evidence 
shows it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the 
petitioner.”8 
 Contending he can make the required showing, Burton points to various pieces of 
evidence that tend to undermine the credibility of the lead witness against him, Marie 
Williams. Marie Williams was the wife of Hugh Williams, a co-conspirator arrested at the 
scene of the Fairmount Park ambush. According to Marie Williams’s trial testimony, Burton 
met in her basement with her husband and other confirmed assailants discussing the subject 
of “killing pigs” and blowing up a police station near the park. At trial, it was known and 
brought forth that Marie Williams had previously, in a preliminary hearing, denied any 
awareness of Burton’s participation in conspiratorial conversations in her basement. Marie 
Williams’s trial testimony explained that this discordant preliminary hearing testimony was 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Pennsylvania courts. 
7 Because the facts are not in dispute, we exercise de novo review over the District Court’s 
determination that Burton’s petition is untimely. See Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 
329 (3d Cir. 2012). 
8 McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1933 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329) (internal quotation 
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a lie in order to protect her husband, who had not yet been tried or sentenced for his role in 
the conspiracy. Marie Williams’s trial testimony was supported by the purported fact that, 
on the night of the murder, she gave a statement to police that incriminated her husband and 
several other black power militants, including Burton.  
 Burton now produces a letter allegedly from Marie Williams to law enforcement 
officials written weeks after the ambush. Commenting on her post-ambush statements to 
police, the letter states that “The statements that they forced me to give about my husband, 
Fred Burton and the others are all untrue and I will not repeat those lies again. So far as I 
know my husband nor any of the others I know had anything to do with the crimes they 
have been charged with.” App. at 585. Burton also produces both the typed transcript and 
handwritten detective notes from Marie Williams’s interviews with police on the night of 
and night after the ambush. These show that, in Marie Williams’s first interview with 
police, she said there were six conspirators but named only five—none Burton. Burton next 
produces the transcript of the preliminary hearing at which Marie Williams denied 
knowledge of Burton’s participation in any conspiracy to murder, which was not actually 
read into the record at Burton’s trial. That transcript shows that Marie Williams was 
informed at that preliminary hearing that nothing she testified to could be used against her 
husband, notwithstanding her later trial testimony that she lied at the preliminary hearing to 
protect her husband. Burton finally produces the transcript of Marie Williams’s immunity 
hearing, which he contends—along with other so-called coercion evidence—contain facts 
                                                                                                                                                                    
marks omitted).  
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suggesting a coercive environment in the police station where she gave her initial 
statements.9 
 According to Burton, no reasonable juror aware of this unpresented information 
would have believed Marie Williams’s trial testimony that she overheard Burton planning 
the conspiracy in her basement. With the new information, he says, jurors would have 
known that her initial statements to police were coerced and that one failed to mention 
Burton anyway, and that she had twice outright exonerated Burton rather than once. 
Meanwhile, he says her trial testimony explaining that she lied in the preliminary hearing to 
protect her husband would have carried no water, given that she did not, in fact, have to 
fear incriminating her husband. The contention is that any reasonable juror would have 
believed that Williams was telling the truth in her exoneration letter and at the preliminary 
hearing, and that she was lying at trial. And given the centrality of Marie Williams’s 
incriminatory trial testimony to the Commonwealth’s case, no reasonable juror would have 
voted to convict.  
 We agree with Burton that no juror who disbelieved Marie Williams’s testimony 
could have voted to convict. We do not agree, however, that the evidence produced by 
Burton is such that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have believed 
her testimony. Burton presents nothing that contradicts Marie Williams’s testimony, i.e., 
nothing that tends to show that Burton was not, in fact, a participant in planning meetings 
                                                   
9 The respondents do not concede that the letter allegedly written by Marie Williams is 
authentic.  
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with Hugh Williams and other conspirators in the Williams’ basement.10 Rather, Burton’s 
evidence is impeachment evidence that calls into question Marie Williams’s credibility but 
does not undermine the content of her testimony. As we have held, “mere impeachment 
evidence is generally not sufficient to satisfy the Schlup standard.”11 
 Yet more, Burton’s assault on Marie Williams’s credibility is incomplete. The jury 
knew that she had changed her story, and to this effect, additional information about when 
and how that story changed would, as the District Court found, have been cumulative. 
Moreover, Burton suggests no reason why Marie Williams had a motive to give false 
testimony against him at trial. To the contrary, Marie Williams’s trial testimony was the 
only official statement she gave after her husband had already been tried and sentenced.12 
Of all the statements she gave, then, Marie Williams’s trial testimony would appear to be 
the one in which she had the least incentive to lie. A reasonable juror could therefore 
                                                   
10 The character evidence pointed to by Burton is not probative in this regard.  
11 Munchinski, 694 F.3d at 338. Burton’s argument to the contrary relies on our decision in 
Lambert v. Beard, where we stated that “confidence in the outcome is particularly doubtful 
when the withheld evidence impeaches a witness whose testimony is uncorroborated and 
essential to the conviction.” See Lambert v. Beard, 633 F.3d 126, 134 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003)). Lambert, however, was not an 
actual innocence case and did not involve application of the Schlup test. Furthermore, our 
judgment in Lambert was vacated by the Supreme Court. See Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 
1195 (2012). 
12 Hugh Williams was tried and convicted in February 1972. In 1974, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court vacated Hugh Williams’s conviction on the finding that his written 
confession was not properly admissible at trial. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 319 A.2d 
419 (Pa. 1974). Hugh Williams was retried in July 1974, convicted, and again sentenced to 
life in prison. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 382 A.2d 1202, 1203 (Pa. 1978). 
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conclude that, of the twists and turns in Marie Williams’s story, the most reliable version of 
events was the incriminating one she offered against Burton at trial.  
 Burton has not made a convincing demonstration of his actual innocence. As such, he 
is not eligible for the actual innocence exception to the § 2244(d) time-bar.  
III. 
 Burton’s second argument is that the applicable filing deadline—which he contends 
should be August 22, 2006—should be equitably tolled because of his presentation of the 
arguments contained in his habeas petition to the Pennsylvania state courts, a necessary 
precursor to federal relief.13 Burton’s state court petition was filed pro se on September 24, 
2004 and amended on September 28, 2005 by counsel to include, inter alia, the instant 
claims. The state court petition was denied as untimely by the Pennsylvania court on 
October 16, 2006; the denial was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on October 
24, 2007; and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Burton’s petition for allowance of 
appeal on October 8, 2008. The instant habeas petition was filed seven and a half months 
later, on May 28, 2009. According to Burton, his diligent pursuit of his claim between 
August 2005 and his federal filing should render his federal filing timely.  
                                                   
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Burton does not argue that he is eligible for tolling under 
§ 2244(d)(2), which provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for 
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 
claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 
Indeed, Burton’s state court petition was dismissed as untimely, and “an untimely [state] 
petition does not toll the statute of limitations for a federal habeas corpus petition.” Merritt 
v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 
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 Burton contends that his claim should accrue on August 22, 2005 because this is the 
date on which he actually obtained a copy of the transcript of the preliminary hearing at 
which Marie Williams testified. There is a problem, however, with using this date as the 
start of Burton’s limitations period: Burton has been aware of the preliminary hearing and 
Marie Williams’s testimony at it since 1970, and there is no reason to think that Burton 
could not have obtained a copy of that transcript—with due diligence—well prior to 2005. 
The District Court consequently found that Burton’s limitations period did not begin on 
August 22, 2005, but rather no later than August 2003, when he possessed all other 
material supporting his claim.  
 We agree with the District Court that Burton’s one year limitations period began no 
later than August 2003. Burton does not dispute that he possessed all relevant material 
other than the preliminary hearing transcript by August 2003. Nor does Burton explain how 
he was thereafter impeded by the respondents or the state courts from obtaining a copy of 
the preliminary hearing transcript,14 or prevented from discovering its contents despite the 
exercise of due diligence.15  
 Under § 2244(d), the latest plausible deadline for Burton to file his federal habeas 
petition was one year later, in August 2004. Burton did not file his state petition, however, 
until September 2004. Burton’s federal claims were thus untimely by the time his state 
                                                                                                                                                                    
417 (2005) (“Because the state court rejected petitioner's PCRA petition as untimely, it was 
not “properly filed,” and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”). 
14 See § 2244(d)(1)(B). 
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petition was filed. We therefore we do not reach Burton’s argument that the applicable 
limitations period should be tolled for the period in which his state petition was pending.  
 The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.16   
                                                                                                                                                                    
15 See § 2244(d)(1)(D). 
16 Burton additionally raises a cursory argument that the Commonwealth should be 
equitably estopped from asserting AEDPA’s time-bar because of its “thirty-one years of 
fraudulent concealment of exculpatory evidence.” Appellant’s Br. 47. Burton does not, 
however, say how his alleged inability to access the alleged Brady information is 
attributable to fraud. Thus, even assuming (without deciding) that the § 2244(d) time-bar is 
subject to equitable estoppel, we lack a basis to conclude that the Commonwealth should be 
estopped from asserting that his claim is time-barred. 
